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Michael Shiyung Liu
During the second half of the 20th century, the US government and US-
based NGOs more than doubled their funding of overseas medical programs, 
bringing it up to thirty percent of total foreign aid expenditure. There has, 
however, been little direct study of the role American medical aid has played 
in building the long-term security, stability, governance, or legitimacy of East 
Asian countries where adverse health conditions may affect US interests. This 
article sheds light on American medical aid to China in the turbulent decades 
of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Chinese Civil War (1947-1949), 
and the subsequent scission of China into two political entities, when the 
Nationalist government had to face health problems directly linked to armed 
combat as well as epidemic diseases.
Epidemic control was not the leading priority during the Sino-Japanese 
War (1937-1945). The treatment of the epidemics that swept the country was 
largely overshadowed by health problems more directly linked to the war. 
However, the emergency measures and structures implemented during the 
war, and largely inanced by American organizations, were the foundations 
for epidemic control in the post-war era. Between 1945 and 1952, plague 
and cholera were endemic throughout China, and over the same period it was 
estimated that more than one million people were infected with malaria. These 
“post-war” epidemics which were attributed to the destruction of quarantine 
systems as well as to the movement of refugees through the country had a 
serious impact on people’s lives and hindered recovery projects put in place 
by local and regional authorities. 2 Controlling these epidemics soon became 
1. The research has been supported by the National Science Council of Taiwan projects 
NSC101-2410-H-001-022 and NSC99-2410-H-001-044-MY2.
2. Liu 2011.
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a common goal uniting Japanese-trained and American-inluenced medical 
professionals in the country.
Drawing on archives from the Rockefeller Archive Center (New York), 3 
Academia Historica and the National Defense Medical Center (NDMC) in 
Taiwan, and Japan Diet Library, this article aims to portray the challenge of 
controlling epidemics during the early post-WWII period in China and of 
reconstructing epidemic control systems in Taiwan from 1949 onward. In 
addition to focusing on the post-WWII era, it traces the long-term cooperation 
between Nationalist China and US philanthropic organizations such as the 
American Bureau of Medical Aid to China (ABMAC) as well as the Rockefeller 
Foundation and its medical afiliate, the China Medical Board (CMB) prior to 
1945. It also assesses the impact of the Nationalist Government’s withdrawal 
to Taiwan on the rebuilding of epidemic prevention systems in mainland China 
and Taiwan.
American medical aid in wartime China
The motives for reestablishing a public health system in post-WWII 
China were twofold. One reason was the urgent need to prevent the return 
of epidemics as a result of long-term war damage. The other was to resume 
the efforts in public health modernization which had been interrupted by 
the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese war. According to Yip Ka-che, the American-
oriented medical curriculum as well as the technical approaches of the 
Rockefeller Foundation were adopted by the majority of the health oficials 
of the Nationalist government during the 1930s as a part of the public health 
modernization scheme. 4 However, there were many obstructions to the 
ambitious scheme that Americans and the Nationalist government proposed. 
Yip shows that the agricultural economy was a signiicant hindrance to the 
project, since industrialization was a key factor in the development of the 
American public health system. 5 Besides, to most historians of modern China, 
3. A great deal of inancial support and ideas to reform public health infrastructure in 
China were provided by the Rockefeller Foundation and its afiliate the China Medical 
Board. The Rockefeller Archive Center is a treasure for historians who are interested 
in inding primary documents on medical reform in Republican China. The Center also 
holds other resources on medical aid to China from the US thanks to the Foundation’s 
central position in medical reform in China since the irst decade of the 20th century.
4. Yip 1995.
5. Yip 1982: 1197-1205.
Epidemic Control and Wars in Republican China (1935-1955)
113
the military conlict between Japan and China during the period was another 
major factor delaying the modernization efforts.
In mainland China, the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) and the 
CMB, both funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, had been major actors in 
transforming medical and public health systems since the irst decade of the 
20th century. 6  However, in response to the crisis caused by the escalating Sino-
Japanese war, expatriate Chinese and alumni from PUMC set up the American 
Bureau for Medical Aid to China (ABMAC), later the American Bureau for 
Medical Advancement in China. ABMAC was a philanthropic organization 
whose sole aim was to assist the medical modernization in wartime China.
The Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 was only the irst step in what 
became a much larger campaign to expand Japanese inluence in Northern 
China, a campaign that resulted in full-scale war between Japan and China in 
1937. The invasion of China proper began in earnest with “The North China 
Incident,” a military clash that occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops 
in 1937 near Beiping (today’s Beijing) in North China. Before “The North 
China Incident,” the Defense of the Great Wall or Battle of Gubeikou (also 
known as “Operation Nekka” or “First Battle of Hopei”) took place between 
January 1 and May 31, 1933 (Map 1). 7 Gubeikou, the gateway to Beiping 
was invaded in March 10, 1933 and the battle lasted until May 14. In the irst 
three days of battle, the number of Japanese casualties reached two thousand. 
During the whole period before the cease-ire agreement on May 31, 1933, at 
least 620,000 Chinese soldiers died in action. Twice as many died from disease. 
Infectious diseases such as dysentery, measles, smallpox, and pneumonia were 
the soldier’s greatest enemies. The cold, poor hygiene, the lack of adequate 
sanitation, shelter and suitable clothing, the poor quality of food and water, 
and the crowded conditions were ideal breeding grounds for disease. 8 Various 
estimates exist on the number of casualties inlicted during the Battle of 
Gubeikou, 9 but one common estimate is as follows in chart 1.
6. For a review of their work in medical modernization in China, cf. Bullock 1980; 
Ferguson 1970.
7. Lindsay 1945: 172-176; Hsu and Chang 1971: 159-161.
8. Zhonghua minguo waijiao wenti yanjiuhui 1965; Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang 
weiyuanhui 1981; Liaoning renmin chubanshe 1991.
9. Shi 2005: 517-573.
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Source: Michael Lindsay (1945): 173.
Map 1. “The North China Incident”
Casualties
Killed Wounded Missing Total
Chinese 6,100 + 24,000 8,000+ 38,100+(est.)
Japanese 2,600- 10,800 6,500- 19,900 +
Source: US, Department of State (1943). Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 
1931-1941. Washington (D.C.), US, Government Printing Ofice: 44-52; Michael Lindsay 
(1945).
Chart 1. Casualty estimates for the Battle of Gubeikou between March 10 and 14
During the invasion of the North China Plain by Japanese troops, the 
Chinese government was unable to provide suficient medical care and PUMC 
doctors played an important role in caring for both military personnel and 
the civilians caught up in the conlict. 10 Dr. Robert Lim, a physiologist, at the 
10. “Dr. Robert Lim Outlines Medical Relief Work,” no. 66, June 21, 1941, Daily 
Bulletin, China Information Committee, folder “National Red Cross Society of China, 
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PUMC faculty organized the irst medical supplies to the ield at Gubeikou 
and secured relief from the International Red Cross. Robert Lim (1897-1969), 
was born in Singapore and studied medicine at Edinburgh University. He went 
on to head the PUMC Physiology department from 1926 to 1937. 11 With his 
experience on the frontline in North China and his patriotic spirit, Dr. Lim 
became chairman of the Army Medical Administration in the Nationalist 
government’s Military Affairs Commission in December 1937, just before the 
Japanese invasion of Nanjing.
Assistance provided by American funding had been, in part, to run medical 
schools such as those created in Beijing (1906), Jinan (1909), Chengdu and 
Changsha (1914), which were fully supported by American on-going donations 
from the Rockefeller Foundation. 12 However, assistance provided by American 
funding was not only for the day-to day running of the medical schools; it also 
took the form of assistance in times of acute crises, such as when the Yellow 
River was looded in 1938. Following the outbreak of the war in 1937, the 
Japanese army marched rapidly into the heart of Chinese territory. On June 
6, 1938, they captured Kaifeng, the capital of Henan, and threatened to take 
over Zhengzhou, at the junction of the arterial Pinghan and Longhai Railways, 
which would have directly endangered the major cities of Wuhan and Xian. 
To stop further Japanese advances, Nationalist troops intentionally broke the 
levees of the Yellow River near Huayuankou to “use water as a substitute for 
soldiers.” 13 Water looded into Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu. The loods covered 
and destroyed thousands of square kilometers of farmland and shifted the 
mouth of the Yellow River hundreds of miles to the south. 14 Thousands of 
villages were inundated or destroyed and several million villagers were driven 
from their homes. In the following months, cases of infectious diseases were 
reported in the looded areas. Japanese records show that cholera, paratyphoid, 
dysentery, and severe diarrhea were often reported to local authorities. 15 
Each side tried to blame the other for the outbreaks. And while the Chinese 
government did not undertake a major relief operation to aid the displaced, 
the Japanese took every chance to promote their “merciful action” in saving 
Robert K.S. Lim,” box 22, series II: Permanent ile, ABMAC, RBML, Columbia 
University.
11. Rockefeller Archive Center (abb. RAC), RF archive, RG 2-1954, Series 601, Box 45, 
Folder 305, “Robert K.S. Lim.”
12. On the medical schools in the irst decades of the 20th century, cf. Lucas 1982; 
Anonymous 1933; and Yin 2008.
13. Lary 2004: 143.
14. Lary 2001: 191-207.
15. Xin min hui nianbao 1938: 322-327.
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the population from the loods. 16 However, there is no real evidence that either 
side engaged in much by way of emergency rescue activity in the immediate 
aftermath of the looding unleashed on June 5. Any such operations would 
have had a very limited impact due to the huge areas affected.
The deliberate looding of the Yellow River has been described as the 
“largest act of environmental warfare in history” 17 causing the death of 470,000 
to 500,000 people and the displacement of 5 to 6.1 million others. 18 While 
the survivors blamed both the disaster on both the Japanese Imperialists and 
Chinese Nationalists, parts of the looded region became a fertile recruiting 
ground for Chinese communists. 19
The Nationalist government, although accused of inaction, 20 did try to 
reduce the impact of the Huayuankou looding, not through immediate action 
but through an urgent call for international assistance in this context of war. 
As early as 1933, in the defense of Gubeikou, Robert Lim had demonstrated 
the urgent need for military medicine in modern warfare in China, and also 
revealed the importance of the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China, 
the International Red Cross' Chinese branch, for irst aid in the ield, as well 
as a channel for receiving international aid. By 1937, despite friction between 
the different organizations—the PUMC, the Nationalist government, and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross—the implementation of an 
emergency healthcare system and the constitution of a medical corps became 
the top priorities of both Red Cross Society of the Republic of China and the 
National Health Department in Nanjing. 21 The American Bureau of Medical 
Aid for China (ABMAC) was essential to Robert Lim’s work. Set up mainly 
by Chinese Americans in 1937, ABMAC supplies were initially distributed 
to the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China and its Medical Relief 
Commission (later Corps), both headed by Robert Lim. At that time, China’s 
armed forces had only the most rudimentary military medical services 22 and 
civilian medical services were insuficient too. In early July, immediately after 
the looding of Huayuankou, ABMAC was able to make a grant of $1,000 to 
the Hankow Rest House and $1,000 to the University Hospital in Nanjing from 
16. Zhina shibian huabao, no. 33 (Meiri xinwen, July 11, 1938).
17. Taylor 2009: 154-155.
18. Perry 1980: 15.
19. Lary 2001: 204.
20. Lary 2001: 204.
21. Zhang 2001.
22. Watt 1992: 2.
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the Bureau’s fund-raising efforts for Chinese refugees and lood victims. 23 
However, as Dr. Co Tui, ABMAC director, later stated “We had to hold on 
to the Nanking (Nanjing) funds, as the city fell into the hands of a puppet 
Japanese government at just about that time.” 24 It seemed that foreign medical 
aid was suspended.
Reserving modern medical resources in wartime China
As the war progressed, Japanese forces progressively took control of 
Shanghai, the capital Nanjing and Wuhan, forcing the Chinese central 
government to relocate to Chongqing, in Sichuan, southwest China which was 
far from the reach of Western medicine. Records from the time show 8,900 
registered physicians, 2,740 pharmacies and dispensaries, 3,700 midwives 
and 575 nurses in the entire country. 25 In southwestern remote areas, most 
medical services were still provided by mostly unqualiied practitioners and 
druggists practicing traditional Chinese medicine. In the countryside, where 
the majority of the population lived, practitioners were generally farmers who 
sold medicinal herbs as a sideline. 26 The Nationalist government’s retreat to 
Chongqing coincidentally brought the resources of modern medicine to this 
part of China, paving the way for post-war reconstruction.
The core of the limited medical resource in southwest China was the well-
trained medical practitioners and public health workers who had retreated with 
the government. These professions had been greatly supported by the Nationalist 
government’s medical modernization scheme in the 1930s. Dr. Robert Lim’s 
colleague, Liu Rui-heng (Dr. J. Heng Liu), the former chancellor of the PUMC 
and a Harvard medical school alumni had played a key role in promoting this 
modernization project by adopting American standards. 27 One of Liu’s main 
tasks was to replace the dominant German coniguration of Chinese military 
23. RAC, RF archive, RG 2-1954, Series 200, Box 10, Folder 70 “Medicine on a Mission”: 
4, 5.
24. RAC, RF archive, RG 2-1954, Series 200, Box 10, Folder 70 “Medicine on a Mission”: 
4, 11.
25. Watt 1992: 3.
26. The condition of medical services was commonly criticized by American donors. 
The Rockefeller Foundation and the CMB repeatedly played on the poor medical 
infrastructure in order to promote themselves as the heroic saviors of China. RAC, 
RF archive, RG 2-1954, Series 200, Box 10, Folder 70 “Medicine on a Mission”: 16-
18.
27. For Liu Rui-heng’s career, please refer to Liu 1989.
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medicine to meet the criteria of American standards. 28 Liu’s mission to reform 
medical training in the military was later taken over by Robert Lim and resulted 
in the creation of a reservoir of modern medical resources within the military 
as well as the maintenance of links with American supporters. 29 This became 
very important when the Nationalist government retreated to Chongqing and 
relied heavily on military personnel to keep modern epidemic control systems 
running. Based on the experience he had gained in Northern China and 
through international connections with ABMAC as well as other American aid 
organizations, in 1938, Dr. Robert Lim set up the Emergency Medical Service 
Training School in Guizhou. This was the irst such establishment for training 
doctors, nurses and medical orderlies for the army and civil relief services. This 
school later expanded to several campuses and units until 1942. The school’s 
mission was to respond to the medical demands of the battleield and to provide 
the means for post-war reconstruction. 30 During the war, over 13,000 medical 
personnel of various categories were trained there. 31 The Emergency Medical 
Service Training School was sponsored by the Nationalist government and 
ABMAC and staffed by some of Robert Lim’s former PUMC students and 
colleagues. They worked alongside the renamed Medical Relief Corps in 
spreading modern medical knowledge to army medical personnel and local 
communities. During the whole period of resistance to the Japanese invasion, 
the Emergency Medical Service Training School worked with ABMAC and 
played a key role in receiving American aid and merging the German system 
into American standards. With the help of American resources received via 
ABMAC during this war period, Robert Lim continued the work in Guizhou 
that had been started in Nanjing by his former PUMC colleague Liu Rui-heng.
At irst sight, the Emergency Medical Service Training School was 
set up for military purpose; however, the reasons behind its establishment 
in southwest China were more ambitious. A review document from the 
Rockefeller Foundation revealed that on the recommendation of ABMAC, 
the main target was to relocate the Army Medical Service Training Unit to 
the Emergency Medical Service Training School in Sichuan under Lim’s 
commend. A CMB report from the time states: “I am certain that if there is 
continuity after the war in national health training, it will prove to be of a 
much more signiicant nature than pre-war training, due to the methods of 
28. Wu 1995: 12-14.
29. Wu 1995: 13-29.
30. Liu 1993: 147.
31. RAC, RF archive, RG 2-1954, Series 601, Box 45, Folder 305, “Robert K.S. Lim.”
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training introduced in Changsha by Robert Lim.” 32 With the effects of the 
war, the project of establishing public health centers in the 1930s by Liu Rui-
heng and its mission of controlling epidemics was so extended that the single 
Central Training Station in Chongqing was obviously insuficient. Boosted 
by graduates from the Emergency Medical Service Training School and army 
medical corpsmen, provincial and county centers were rapidly established, 
beginning with Guizhou and remote counties of Sichuan. 33 For example, in 
1941 the National Health Administration reported that 76 of 84 counties in 
Guizhou had established such health centers while only 11 counties had such 
services before 1935. 34 In 1944, the Provincial government of Sichuan reported 
that 116 of 140 counties in Sichuan had “some form of health center.” 35
The effort to continue the medical training program and local health reforms 
in southwest China was not intended to immediately reduce the health crisis 
in China during the war, but to maintain the capability to implement post-
war reconstruction. From 1941, students from Emergency Medical Service 
Training School, for example, were asked to join the Army Sanitary Corps and 
the Red Cross Medical Relief Corps on the battle front and in unoccupied areas. 
While the school and its branches were designed to act as medical centers or 
battleield stations in times of war, they would easily be converted to civilian 
healthcare in peacetime. 36 By the end of 1943, near 66% of the graduates of 
Emergency Medical Service Training School were removed from combat 
zones and relocated to various positions in civilian services. 37 The Emergency 
Medical Service Training School and the Central School of Army Surgery 
were both located in Guizhou and provided medical care for the military and 
civilian population. 38 Between 1941 and 1945, the Emergency Medical Service 
Training School therefore had a double role. It trained servicemen for medical 
duties and at the same time trained local people to respond to both military 
and civilian medical needs. 39 Dr. Robert Lim planned that these local trainees 
would form the foundation for healthcare after the end of the war.
32. RAC, RF archive, RG 1.1, Series 601, Box 5-6, “Annual report, 1938.”
33. League of Nations Health Organization 1938: 1-3. See also Bullock 1980: 193.
34. “Public Health and Medicine,” China Handbook, 1937-1943 (New York, Macmillian, 
1943): 667, 674.
35. Bullock 1980: 198-99.
36. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Announcement (1941): 1.
37. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Second Report (1942-1943): 4.
38. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Training Program: Stage medical 
Education (1941): 6-8.




The results of Dr. Lim’s plan seemed positive. Major Mendelson of the 
US Army visited the Emergency Medical Service Training School in 1942, 
and declared that the technical short-term emergency training was managed 
effectively, showing good results in the prevention and mass-treatment 
of disease. 40 The progress of sanitary training was made in two ways: the 
enrolment of local helpers for public health services, and establishment of 
several nursing schools for young women. To improve the transportation of 
medical services, a ield ambulance battalion was organized and staffed with 
Army medical oficers and Red Cross personnel to teach local helpers how to 
coordinate supplies and personnel requirements. The purpose was to increase 
the numbers of trained medical personnel who could support the military in 
times of war and work in their local communities during peacetime. 41 The 
picture showing the group photo of graduating stretcher-bearers attests to this 
effort (photo 1). Moreover, American oficers were to be attached to these 
units, if available. Some of the best of Chinese oficers and staff were sent 
to America for advanced training with the US Army. After returning home, 
they were charged with training as many instructors as possible, military and 
civilian, who would be sent to the front and to unoccupied areas. 42 This strategy 
was clearly not only for the speciic medical demands of wartime, but was also 
for the peacetime that would eventually follow.
In the 19th century, when the Chinese encountered Western medicine, 
their irst sight was commonly a nurse caring for a patient. Although nurse 
training has a long history in China, dating from the arrival of missionaries 
and missionary medicine, according to the CMB only a few schools offered 
advanced nursing programs which could meet American standards. From 
1920 onwards the PUMC served as the irst graduate school for the training of 
teachers of nursing and hospital administrators and offered a combined course 
in which graduates of a two-year pre-nursing course could continue to a three-
year course at the PUMC leading to a Diploma in nursing and a Bachelor 
degree. 43 In 1930, the headquarters of the Nurses Association of the Republic 
of China (NARC), supported by the CMB, moved to Nanjing. In addition to 
Western nurses, the majority of NARC members were PUMC alumni, which 
reveals its close connection to American medicine. 44
40. RAC, CMB Inc. archive, Series CMB, Box 122, Folder 886, “G. Correspondence.”
41. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Second Report (1942-1943): 16-
17.
42. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Second Report (1942-1943): 17
43. Liu 1991: 315-324.
44. Liu 1991: 322-323.
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Courtesy by John Watt of ABMAC.
Photo 1. Bearer training and local stretcher-bearer.
During the Sino-Japanese war, many young Chinese women who aspired to 
serve their country were attracted by the nurse training programs. 45 However, 
the Central School of Army Surgery was an all-male unit even in wartime. With 
continuing help and donations from the ABMAC, the Emergency Medical 
Service Training School at Tuyunguan had gained experience of treating open 
wounds with sulfanilamide powder. 46 However, due to the limited number of 
military surgeons and civilian physicians in the region, most of the treatment was 
done by nurses or nursing orderlies trained at the Emergency Medical Service 
Training School. The nursing department of that school was headed by a PUMC 
graduate, Miss Zhou Mei-yu. Zhou divided the department into two training 
sections. One was a regular school for registered military and civilian nurses. 
The other was an intensive program in basic nursing skills, mostly addressed to 
local women who would later serve as formal nurses’subordinates. 47 This form 
45. Pan 1997: 129.
46. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Second Report (1942-1943): 51.
47. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Report (1943): 22.
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of nurse training was very beneicial to local communities and had a similar 
impact to the training of local stretcher-bearers. 48
The selection of local candidates for Emergency Medical Service Training 
School nursing programs reveals China’s socio-economic conditions. 
Graduation from a junior middle school was required for admission, while 
formal schools of medicine and nursing demanded senior high school 
graduation. The reason of such criteria was, as a recruitment poster reveals: 
“graduates (of junior middle school) those who already have suficient cultural 
and political background will beneit their hometown at the same time as 
promoting national policy… At this age they are usually more receptive, 
idealistic, and unafraid of the dificulties and hardships in training and the 
mission of bringing new knowledge back to home… The graduates’families in 
their hometown are usually better off inancially, which will also secure their 
social status at the same time as promoting modern medicine in conservative 
rural areas….” 49 Although American observers in 1943 had criticized the 
Emergency Medical Service Training School’s curriculum as “a limit to 
which unqualiied personnel can be technicalized and promoted…” 50, the 
effort to maintain modern healthcare systems in wartime China for post-war 
reconstruction was later carried on by the creation of the National Defense 
Medical Center in 1947. The NDMC moved with the Nationalist government 
to Taiwan in 1949, bringing with it some of its war-time experience.
Post-World War II legacy one: ighting epidemics  
as if ighting the enemy
In the optimistic atmosphere created by the victory against Japan in 1945, 
the Nationalist government announced a series of public health projects on 
its return to Nanjing. 51 Although some of these projects were unrealistic in 
the devastated post-war conditions, several institutes were established with 
American support. 52 For example, The Malaria Research Institute, founded 
in 1936 with support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the CMB, moved 
48. The stretcher-bearer was mainly civilian but could be recruited to work as supplement 
combat medics. (Ibid.)
49. Emergency Medical Service Training School (ed.), Report-supplement (1942): 40-41.
50. RAC, CMB Inc. archive, RG 1-1945, Series CMB, Box 162, Folder 812, “G. 
Correspondence.”
51. Chen 1981: 21.
52. Chen 1982: 14.
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from Yunnan to Nanjing with the Rockefeller Foundation’s support in 1947. 
An experimental DDT spraying project was also set up in the same year with 
many tons of free chemicals from the US army. In 1947, Jiangning, a village 
outside the city of Nanjing, was jointly selected by the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the government to set up an experimental DDT spraying station—the 
irst such demonstration station on Chinese territory—under the direction of 
malariologist Zhou Qinxian and American scientist Robert Briggs Watson. 
At this time, levels of malaria on the newly-liberated island of Taiwan were 
much lower than on mainland China and the island did not receive supplies of 
DDT. 53 Despite medicine and sanitation being modernized during the Japanese 
colonial period (1895-1945), 54 in early post-World War II years Taiwan was 
in bad shape and suffered from many epidemics.  55 However, mainland China 
received the majority of American donations of medical resources until late 
1947, when the provincial government in Taipei started to receive signiicant 
aid from the US. 56
Controlling epidemics was not the only motive for the Nationalist 
government to resume the 1930s project and build on its wartime experience. 
During the irst-half of the 1950s, the Nationalist government in Taiwan was 
eager to gain the support of the US to block invasion from mainland China. 
Maintaining philanthropic work such as epidemic control and public health 
improvement in Taiwan could be a strategy to continue the cooperation between 
Nationalist Taiwan and the US in the post-World War II era. 57 After the end of 
the war, James A. Crabtree, Deputy Surgeon General of the US Public Health 
Service from 1946 to 1948 promoted the idea of building a new organization 
for international public health, 58 a mission that had been carried out by the 
League of Nations before the war. World War II had severely curtailed the 
international cooperation-based disease control efforts carried out by the 
Health Section of the League of Nations in Geneva, a European city trapped 
in the debris of war damage. A proposal by Brazil and China to establish an 
international health organization in the 1945 San Francisco Conference was 
53. RAC, Robert Briggs Watson, “Annual Report of Activities, 1946,” RG 5, IHB/D, 
Series 3, Box 217, Folder 600. RAC, J.H. Paul, “A report on the year’s activities for 
year 1946,” RG 5, IHB/D, Series 3, Box 217, Folder 600.
54. Liu 2009.
55. Chen 2000: 35-36; Zhuang 1998: 364-365.
56. RAC, “Annual Report 1949,” p. 3, RG 5, IHB/D, Series 3, Box 217, Folder 600.
57. Ambivalence about how the security situation in East Asia was assessed by the US can 
be found among seasoned experts. For example, Scalapino 1991/1992: 26, 32, 36.
58. Williams 1951: 487.
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soon recognized by the US Public Health Service. 59 Civilian organizations 
including Johns Hopkins University, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 
American Medicine Association recommended speciically that the United 
Stated government include non-governmental charity resources in the early 
formation of a new international organization that would be closely linked to the 
United Nations. 60 With abundant American resources from both governmental 
and private organizations, the World Health Organization represented a multi-
lateral approach to international public health, also mobilizing the cooperation 
of many nations in pursuing common goals. 61 The involvement of American 
civilian doctors and military surgeons for public health reconstruction in East 
Asia was benevolent but also political and strategic. Public health and medical 
reform in China could be seen as part of the broader American model of the 
professionalization of medicine in an East Asian ally after World War II.
When the irst WHA (World Health Assembly) conference passed the 
charter to establish the WHO in 1948, the Nationalist government in China had 
already lost diplomatic support from the US government along with all forms of 
aid. After the failure of negotiations by General George C. Marshall in China, 
President Truman announced in The China White Paper in August 1949 the 
withdrawal of all support from China and blamed the decision on corruption 
in the Nationalist government. The damage to the Nationalist government was 
tremendous; it notably caused its retreat to Taiwan. 62 Following this change of 
US diplomatic policy toward China, the China Medical Board also stopped its 
aid to China and prepared to withdraw its staff from Taiwan. 63 Even Robert 
Lim was losing his support from American colleagues in US, as one member 
of CMB put it: “nor am I sure that he is still serving in that capacity (of seeking 
donations in/from the US).” 64 Moving to Taiwan and making compromises to 
59. Williams 1947: 68.
60. World Health Organization (ed.) 1958: 38-40.
61. Williams 1951: 821-824.
62. Zhuang 2000: 143-144. Although the letter from the Rockefeller Foundation to the 
CMB did not point out the causality between the China White Paper and the withdrawal 
of personnel, it did quote from the China White Paper to illustrate the Sino-American 
relations. For cases, please check RAC, “Letter from Chester I. Barnard to John D. 
Rockefeller 12, Sept., 1950,” Collection: RF, RG: 2-1950, Series 200: US, Box 478, 
Folder 3207.
63. RAC, “Letter from Dr. Balfour to Dr. Strode, 25, Feb., 1949,” Collection: RF, RG: 1, 
Series 601, Box 44, Folder 361.
64. RAC, “Letter to Dr. Hugh Smith, May, 22, 1950,” Collection: RF, RG: 2-1950, 
Series 601, 605, Box 501, Folder 3349-3350.
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accept doctors who had been trained in Japanese colonial medicine was the 
only solution for the Nationalist government in 1949.
At the end of World War II, Taiwan was returned to China and became re-
integrated into China’s administrative structure. As far as health matters were 
concerned, the island not only underwent changes in the organization of its 
health agencies, but was also very affected by the spread of diseases from 
the mainland. 65 In 1945, the Taiwanese provincial government reorganized the 
health model inherited from the Japanese by removing Public Health from the 
Police Department and placing it in a new Bureau of Sanitation (Weishengju). 66 
The change did not, however, create a strong and eficient agency. A scholar 
underlined how public health in early postwar Taiwan was merely a system that 
“put out ires,” and not a reliable system to handle the needs of public health. 67 
In 1946, a Rockefeller Foundation evaluation of sanitary conditions in Taiwan 
revealed the “modern” and “medieval” aspects of Japanese colonial sanitation. 
The use of night soil for fertilizer, sleeping and living on wooden loors in 
small damp houses, and many other customs were potential public health risks. 
Before World War II, the Sanitary Police were in charge of environmental 
sanitation but its members lacked proper training in public health and its budget 
was limited. 68 Undoubtedly, post-war Taiwan urgently needed new health 
resources and administrative skills to ill the vacuum caused by the defeat of 
the Japanese in August 1945. Changes of government, economic depression, 
movements of people, shortages of medication, and the neglect of the public 
health infrastructure all contributed to the resurgence of infectious diseases in 
Taiwan between 1946 and 1947. Cases of cholera, smallpox, and plague were 
reported, and it is estimated that more than one million people were infected 
with malaria during these years.
In order to stop the further spread of epidemics from mainland China, new 
regulations for port quarantine, based on the most updated standards, became 
effective in December 1946. Taiwanese personnel manned the ports of entry 
under the guidance of Chinese oficials, who were themselves trained in 
laboratory techniques under American supervision. 69 Owing to the poor health 
65. For a case study of epidemics in early post-World War II Taiwan, see Chen 2000.
66. Su 2004: 185.
67. Chen 2000: 101-105.
68. RAC, CMB, RG 5, IHB/D, Series 3, Box 217, Folder 600, “Annual Report 1949”: 3-5.
69. “Gechu guanyu meiyun yiyao buzhu defang de yuebaobiao he laiwang gongwen” 
[Various monthly reports and documents on American medical aid], archives of 
Weishengbu (National Health Department), Box 372, no. 613 (1947), The Second 
Historical Archives of China (Nanjing).
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conditions in post-war Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist government put in place 
stringent immunization requirements, and in 1947, revised the regulations to 
bring them more in line with standard international quarantine practices. 70 
Under the supervision of the Plague Prevention Division of Southeast China, a 
section of the National Health Department of the Nationalist government that 
channeled foreign medical aid, quarantine controls proved successful.
The diversion of labor and materials during the Sino-Japanese War had a 
dramatic impact on epidemic control, even by the relatively low 1945 standards. 
Smallpox vaccination programs were either completely discontinued or were 
not enforced from 1945 to 1946. Environmental sanitation was virtually 
nonexistent, while public water supply and waste collection facilities had 
been severely damaged in areas that had been bombed or suffered from lack 
of funds. 71 Those areas that escaped the devastation of war had deteriorated 
badly through neglect, as well as a shortage of materials and supplies. The 
withdrawal of American organizations further suffocated the re-construction 
of the public health infrastructure in Taiwan. The ABMAC along with other 
American organizations had cooperated with the Nationalist government to 
improve public health in China during and after the Sino-Japanese war. 72 But 
unlike the CMB and other American counterparts, the ABMAC continued to 
cooperate with the Nationalist government after its retreat to Taiwan. 73 Aware 
of the decision made by the US State Department and CMB, the ABMAC 
chose to support the Nationalist government in Taiwan. 74
ABMAC saw communism as a threat to religious freedom, and especially 
to Christianity. To keep the donation to “Free China (Taiwan),” the Executive 
Committee of ABMAC repeatedly asserted “No gift to the ABMAC ever goes 
to Communist-held areas […] the donation will only be sent to Free China.” 75 
Between 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1952, the ABMAC was 
the sole channel of American inluence in public health in Taiwan. Working 
with the National Defense Medical Center in Taiwan, Liu Rui-heng replaced 
70. RAC, CMB, RG 5, IHB/D, Series 3, Box 217, Folder 600, “Annual Report 1947.”
71. RAC, CMB, RG 5, IHB/D, Series 3, Box 217, Folder 600, “Annual Report 1949.”
72. Watt 1992.
73. RAC, RF, RG: 2-1949, Series 200US, Box 441, Folder 2969, “Medicine on a Mission: 
A History of American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, Inc. 1937-1954”: 28 
(section III).
74. RAC, RF, RG: 2-1949, Series 200US, Box 441, Folder 2969, “ABMAC, Board 
Director’s Meeting Agenda.”
75. RAC, RF, RG: 2-1951, Series 200, Box 516, Folder 3449, “Note of ABMAC, 21, May, 
1951.”
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Robert Lim as ABMAC representative. 76 To secure the limited medical 
aid from the ABMAC, Liu encouraged the NDMC faculty to resume some 
programs that America had proposed earlier in pre-civil war mainland China. 
Starting in 1951, the former malariologist at the Nanjing station Zhou Qinxian 
and Zhang Teling, an NDMC parasitologist initiated a DDT spraying pioneer 
project in South Taiwan. 77 The project was in fact the miniature version of 
that carried out in 1947 on the mainland with ABMAC support. The pioneer 
project was later expanded to an island-wide program in 1952 78 which was 
soon recognized by the WHO as a part of the global anti-malaria program.
American medical aid to China and Taiwan helped break down the fatalistic 
view of diseases and natural disasters as parts of the regular natural cycle: 
by blaming plagues and the looding on the Japanese invasion, they drew a 
link between ighting to victory on the battleield and ighting the ravages of 
epidemics and natural disasters. A cartoon in 1947 of the irst annual report of 
the NDMC dramatically relected such a link (Photo 2). Treating diseases and 
public health crises as a real enemy in a combat situation had strong resonance 
in post-war Taiwan and left a deep impact on the anti-malaria program in the 
1950s and 60s. 79 
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1952, with the USSR and Communist 
China supporting North Korea and the USA supporting the South, intensiied 
the Cold War and brought American medical aid back to Taiwan. American 
sources of medical aid in the 1950s and 1960s included public agencies such 
as the Economic Cooperation Administration, private foundations such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Population Council, and the ABMAC as well as the 
General Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo, and universities such as Princeton and 
the University of Michigan. Foreign assistance brought new forms of medical 
treatment and also introduced very different strategies in the identiication of 
disease and public health problems. 80
76. Zhang 2000: 616-622.
77. Wu 1995: 37 and 41.
78. Xingzhengyuan weishengshu 2003: 23-25.
79. Lin and Liu 2010: 183-208.
80. Yang 2008: 91-139.
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Source: The Second Annual Report of NDMC (1948).
Photo 2. The double-mission to ight enemy and disease.
Post-World War II legacy two: the American panacea  
and Taiwanese takers
The malaria eradication campaign is a very good illustration of the 
importance of the American model of public health and medicine in health 
development in postwar Taiwan. The campaign was also part of a global 
effort to combat this deadly disease by DDT indoor residual spraying (IRS). 
While Randall Packard 81 and Yip Ka-che 82 have demonstrated that the result 
of the campaign depended to a signiicant extent on the social and political 
conditions of each country, and on the importance to have qualiied personnel, 
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The DDT program launched in 1951 directly linked anti-malarial activities 
in Taiwan to a global effort in partnership with the WHO. The irst objective 
of the 1951 agreement between the Nationalist government in Taiwan and the 
WHO was “the control of malaria and eventually the eradication of this disease 
in the whole island of Taiwan, with modern methods at the lowest feasible 
cost.” 83 The project aimed to control malaria and other insect-borne diseases, 
and improve the health of the population, agricultural production as well as 
the general economy. The eradication program was preceded for two years by 
scientiic study into the effectiveness of IRS DDT spraying when applied to 
walls made of different materials, ield research into mosquito habitats, and 
cost-effectiveness studies of the various eradication procedures. 84 Generous 
inancial and technical support from the US helped ensure the success of the 
program, which beneited almost every aspect of life in Taiwan.
The 1950s’DDT program in Taiwan not only laid the foundation for future 
malaria control by combining knowledge and experience from Taiwan’s 
colonial past and mainland China, but also signiicantly boosted Taiwanese 
conidence in American public health practices. Along with the rising conidence 
in American medicine, more reforms were on the way. Two American experts, 
Van Hoge and Ross Porter, produced an evaluation of public hospitals in 
Taiwan in 1952 that recommended a radical make-over of the whole system. 85 
To further promote the American model of public health, the Nationalist 
government launched a ive-year Integrated Health Project in 1959 to train 
Taiwanese medical professionals in the “integration of curative and preventive 
medical service” 86—a radical change from colonial medical training to a much 
broader public health approach. In addition, American experts pointed to the 
general weakness of environmental sanitation in post-war Taiwan as a result of 
the Japanese colonial policy of focusing mainly on urban sanitation. Working 
with the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), 87 
83. “Annexes to the Plan of Operations for Malaria Eradication in China (Taiwan),” 
Document 2025, 69, Taiwan Provincial Malaria Research Institute (TAMRI).
84. Watson and Liang 1950: 471-486; Watson, Paul and Liang 1950: 25-43.
85. “Counterpart Budget – PH CY-1953,” March 30, 1953; “CY-53 Counterpart 
Allocation,” June 9, 1953, CIECD36-11-003-001, Institute of Modern History of 
Academia Sinica (hereafter IMHAS).
86. “Application for Local Currency AID Funds-Project #84-55-514,” Dec. 29, 1959, 
CIECD36-11-003-046, IMHAS.
87. The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) was 
established in 1948 in mainland China, then moved to Taiwan, where its work has been 
widely credited with laying the agricultural basis in the 1950s and 1960s for Taiwan’s 
economic, social, and technical development. For its brief history, see Yager 1988.
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American aid agencies subsidized the establishment of the Provincial Institute 
of Environmental Sanitation which went on to create many rural health stations 
in 1955. 88 The “rural health station,” an organization that had been launched in 
the 1910s by PUMC, was maintained during the 1940s in wartime China, and 
was then extended island-wide in Taiwan. In addition to setting up the rural 
health stations, the Institute also trained nurses and technicians who would 
work in them. The training unit was under American supervision. 89 It is worth 
noting that many rural public health projects in Taiwan originated from the 
JCRR’s original plans and experience in mainland China.
The retreat from the mainland brought to Taiwan transmissible diseases 
as well as new ideas and technologies to control them, such as the JCRR 
rural health station plan and the DDT spraying program and other ideas and 
technologies. With a long history of embracing American medical education 
and practices, medical professionals who had retreated from the mainland 
with the Nationalist government, especially military surgeons, attempted to 
reshape the Japanese medical model in Taiwan, stressing the nationalistic 
aspect of the change. Ironically, the pressure of postwar epidemics and cold-
war politics brought a focus to the efforts to reshape public health practices 
in Taiwan which might otherwise have resulted merely in conlicts among 
various medical factions.
In 1949, with help from the CMB and the ABMAC, two-thirds of the 
NDMC staff moved to Taiwan. In Taiwan, General Zhou Mei-yu received 
American support for military nursing education at the NDMC. 90 Yu Daozhen, 
a protégée of General Zhou, was invited to set up a Department of Nursing 
at the National Taiwan University (NTU) in 1956. 91 Following the guidance 
of her mentor General Zhou and American supporters, Yu transformed the 
military nursing training program into a public health nursing program. 92 The 
88. “Taiwan shengzhengfu weishengchu zhi meiyunhui han” [Letter from Taiwanese 
Provincial Health Department to CUSA], April 5, 1957 and “Project Agreement 
Between ICA and CUSA,” March 6, 1958, CIECD36-11-003-067, IMHAS.
89. “Project Proposal & Approval Summary (#84-52-291),” Jan. 8, 1957, 
CIECD36-11-003-067; “Report of Sanitarian Training Program,” Nov. 1, 1957; 
“Taiwansheng huanjing weisheng shiyenso zhi J. I. Connolly han” [Letter from Taiwan 
Provincial Institute of Environmental Sanitation to J. I. Connolly], June 6, 1958, 
CIECD36-11-003-067, IMHAS.
90. Memorandum: “Improvement of Nursing Practice Project-FY 1957 Program,” 
August 31, 1960; “FY 59 PPA-Aid to Medical and Paramedical Education (Improvement 
of Nursing Practices),” August 18, 1958, CIECD6-11-003-038, IMHAS.
91. Cai 2001: 261-262.
92. Chen 1996: 80.
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ABMAC, the RF, and the CMB provided additional support to help establish 
nursing schools at various levels, and in implementing the rural health station 
project.  93 In addition, Yu’s students also claimed that “the reform of nursing 
education at the NTU led to the transformation from the German-Japanese 
system to the British-American system.” 94
From 1952, the authorities in Taiwan began formulating long-term plans for 
improvements based on previous Rockefeller Foundation proposals, but any 
implementation of the plans would depend, to a large extent, on the cooperation 
of local governments and medical professionals in Taiwan. Following the 
outbreak of the Korean War, the US Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) 
sent Emile E. Palmquist and Kaarlo W. Nasi to review Taiwan’s medical 
and public health conditions. 95 Their report later served as the basis for the 
US AID Health Program in Taiwan aimed at maintaining economic stability 
and military power in Taiwan. The report stressed that the target institute to 
which an ambitious program of rehabilitation and technical support would be 
afiliated should be carefully selected. 96 Moreover, as Dr. Edger Hull, Medical 
Consultant to the Mutual Security Agency mission to China (MSA) expressed 
his strong concerns about the quality of the NDMC public health program, 97 
the dean of pathology at NTU also started the “Americanization” of its public 
health program at NTU with NDMC’s close cooperation. 98
In 1951, two American public health experts from the ABMAC, Dr. Magnus 
I. Gregersen and Dr. George H. Humphreys of Columbia University, evaluated 
the medical school at the NTU. Although their proposal for medical school 
reform was too expensive to be implemented, their visit brought the school 
to the Rockefeller Foundation’s attention and ABMAC later provided some 
support to the school. 99 In late 1951, the former dean of the Public Health 
Department of PUMC, Dr. John B. Grant, was invited by Liu Rui-heng to 
help the conversion of the Tropical Institute at NTU into a Department of 
Public Health which was later established with the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
full support. The successful creation of nursing and public health departments 
93. Yang 2008: 111.
94. Liu 2006: 17.
95. “Zhi naizhengbu Taiwan shengzhengfu hangao” [Draft: letter from CUSA to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Taiwan Provincial Government], Sept. 16, 1954, 
CIECD36-11-003-001, IMHAS.
96. Yang 2008: 108.
97. Lu Zhider zhi meiyuanhui han (Letter from Lu Zhider to CUSA), Aug. 7, 1958, 
CIECD36-11-003-104.
98. Yeh 1989: 56.
99. Watt 1995: 174-177.
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laid the foundation for long-term cooperation between the NTU and various 
American aid organizations. 100 In 1955, the US Naval Medical Research Unit 
No. 2 (NAMRU-2) decided to relocate to the afiliated hospital of NTU in 
Taipei. Afiliation with an advanced research institute and a signiicant symbol 
of American medicine in the Far East, vastly enhanced the NTU’s prestige in 
the eastern Paciic Rim region. 101 With this decision, American medicine was 
overwhelmingly accepted by Taiwanese and the strategic relationship between 
the two countries could be further secured as the US AID Health Program had 
expected.
During the 1950s, although the proportion of direct public health and 
medical aid to Taiwan was relatively insigniicant, accounting for about 6% of 
the total amount of American aid between 1951 and 1965, 102 the major portion 
of US support for Taiwan’s public health and medical improvements was more 
indirect, being found in other aid projects. For example, around 10% to 15% of 
the American aid was earmarked for work in rural reconstruction which would 
lead to public health beneits. Meanwhile, the Council for United States Aid 
(CUSA) and the Taiwanese Provincial Health Department worked together 
in coordinating foreign medical aid from the United Nation Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and ABMAC. 103 Soon 
after the successful conclusion of the DDT anti-malaria program, people in 
post-war Taiwan came to believe that foreign aid in medicine would deinitely 
improve public health and medical conditions in the island.
Concluding remarks
This article shows that the role that American philanthropic organizations 
such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the China Medical Board, and the American 
Bureau for Medical Aid to China fulilled in the public health modernization of 
the country was highly limited in the case of Republican China. If their work in 
Mainland China during the Sino-Japanese war was an anomaly, it nevertheless 
inluenced philanthropic interventions in other parts of post-World War II East 
Asia, 104 and particularly in Taiwan during the Cold War. On the surface, US 
100. Medical School of NTU (ed.), middle volume 1998: 16; Du 2008: 27, 29.
101. Xie 1995: 178-181.
102. Zhao 1985: 27-51.
103. Yang 2008: 95-96.
104. Similar pattern of medical intervention on epidemic control to Taiwan can also been 
found in Southeast Asia. See Anononymous 1954.
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funded public health reform in China is in line with the global promotion of 
American epidemic control principles by these philanthropic foundations. The 
control of epidemics in Taiwan was a philanthropic mercy as well as a military 
strategy. 105
How did epidemic control become a strategic tool in the Cold War? During 
his trip to Asia in 1953, political observer James Reston reported:
America’s contribution to the safety and sanity of Asia, however, goes well beyond 
the products of her factories… In Korea, Japan and Formosa (Taiwan), dependence 
on America is so great as to be almost pathetic. I had long talks with Syngman 
Rhee, Premier Yoshida of Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. Each in his own way had 
criticisms to make of American policy and all were asking more. 106
Reston’s description may have merely revealed the general feeling about 
American medical aid to East Asia where Free China or Taiwan is located.
In these conditions, American medical models and professional practices 
eventually guided public health reform in Taiwan between 1952 and the 1960s, 
creating new methods for epidemic control and new professional standards 
for the postwar generation. In the 1960s, as the crude death rate of Taiwanese 
males dropped to less than one per cent, 107 the phenomenon implied a dramatic 
transformation of leading causes of death. The success of the epidemic control 
program must have played a signiicant part in such a transformation (Chart 2). 
105. Siggers 1954.
106. Reston 1953.
107. National Health Administration, online databank on website: http://www.doh.gov.tw/





Diseases Percentage Diseases Percentage
Malaria 10.7 Gastris and enteritis 14.2
Maternal causes 9.2 Pneumonia 13.8
Gastris and entritis 8.5 Tuberculosis 9.6
Tuberculosis 7.1 Heart disease 5.2
Stomach and peptic ulcer 6.8 Stroke 5.1
Pneumonia 4.4 Perinatal mortality 4.6
Bronchitis 4.1 Nephritis and nephritis 3.8
Meningitis 1.9 Cancer 3.2
Stroke 1.4 Bronchitis 3.0
Heart disease 1.3 Malaria 2.9
Chart 2. Leading causes of death in Taiwan in 1942 and 1952
Sources: Taiwan Provincial Government (ed.) (1947). Taiwansheng wushiyi nien lai ton-
gji tiyao (The 51-Year Statistical Summary of Taiwan Province). Nantou, Taiwan Provin-
cial Government, digital data on http://twstudy.iis.sinica.edu.tw/twstatistic50/and National 
Health Administration, online databank on website: http://www.doh.gov.tw/CHT2006/DM/
DM2_2.aspx?now_fod_list_no=9510&class_no = 440&level_no = 1 (2013/5/5 accessed).
The transition from Japanese colonial medicine to a system based 
on American standards brought medical professionalism in Taiwan to 
contemporary levels. Many scholars have therefore seen that the 1950s was 
a crucial period in the irst stage of demographic transition in Taiwan which 
provided human resources to the fast economic growth experienced during 
the 1970s-1980s. 108 Chart 2 again conirms this health transition. 109 Generally 
speaking, Cold War politics played a key role in bringing American medicine 
to Taiwan as described above. However, without the earlier cooperation in 
mainland China, the Americanization of public health infrastructure in Taiwan 
after the retreat of Nationalist government in 1949 might not have been smooth 
and rapid as it was.
108. Such an argument is very popular in the ields of demographic studies and development 
economics. For a review of this argument and its impact to social transformation in 
Taiwan, cf. Freedman 1986.
109. A change in disease patterns in populations testiies to a health transition which is 
determined by four elements: Urbanization, demographic, epidemiologic, socio-
economic and health care. For detail deinitions, see Olshansky and Ault 1986.
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